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Abstract—Data protection authorities worldwide have agreed 
on the value of considering privacy-by-design principles when 
developing privacy-friendly systems and software. However, on 
the technical plane, a profusion of privacy-oriented guidelines 
and approaches coexists, which provides partial solutions to the 
overall problem and aids engineers during different stages of the 
system development lifecycle. As a result, engineers find difficult 
to understand what they should do to make their systems abide 
by privacy by design, thus hindering the adoption of privacy 
engineering practices. This paper reviews existing best practices 
in the analysis and design stages of the system development 
lifecycle, introduces a systematic methodology for privacy 
engineering that merges and integrates them, leveraging their 
best features whilst addressing their weak points, and describes 
its alignment with current standardization efforts. 
Keywords— Privacy by Design; Methodology; Privacy 
Engineering; System Development Lifecycle; Privacy Impact 
Assessment; Risk management; Requirements Operationalization.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The potential benefits of applying privacy-by-design (PbD) 
principles to system development processes are becoming 
increasingly acknowledged by policy-makers [1] and data-
protection authorities [2]. However, the adoption by system 
engineers is still severely hindered by the lack of maturity of 
this discipline in terms of its practical formulation, which 
confronts engineers with a set of challenges.  
First, engineers find hard to translate the abstract, 
ambiguous privacy requirements coming from the legal realm 
and based on ethical values and social perceptions into specific 
technologies and solutions [3][4]. Second, although PbD 
emphasizes the need to take into account the potential privacy 
issues from the outset of a project and through its whole 
lifecycle, very few privacy practices or approaches are 
specifically addressed at dealing with privacy from a system 
engineering perspective, language and mindset. Relatively few 
system engineers have any awareness of these practices [6] –
they rather regard privacy as a mere theoretical concept [7]. 
PbD principles are not operational in their current state, hence 
the need for an engineering approach that integrates privacy in 
mainstream engineering methodologies allowing project 
activities to move beyond socio-legal principles, and factoring 
in engineering privacy [5].  
Third, a severe disconnection exists among different best 
practices (e.g., privacy impact assessments and privacy 
patterns); moreover, existing privacy guidance usually remains 
domain- or stage-specific. This forces engineers to choose 
among diverse, sometimes contradicting, approaches, and do 
their best to integrate them [8]. A standardization effort is 
required to provide engineers with a recognized methodology 
to tackle the aforementioned issues. 
The EU-funded project PRIPARE (Preparing Industry to 
Privacy by Design by supporting its Application in Research) 
is facing these challenges by 1) providing a systematic 
methodology aimed at the complex ecosystem of all the 
stakeholders involved in the production of privacy-friendly 
systems, and which addresses the whole personal data and 
system development lifecycle (SDLC) of projects and systems, 
with the total disregard of their size and domain, 2) detailing 
the engineering processes that allow a move from abstract 
principles to technical requirements, designs and actual 
implementation; and 3) merging and connecting existing best 
practices in the area of PbD into a single methodology, whilst 
providing different alternatives and criteria to choose the most 
adequate for each context and at each stage of the SDLC. 
This paper describes only some of the results of the 
PRIPARE project, focusing on the analysis and design stages. 
Some other aspects such as the integration with mainstream 
SDLCs (e.g., waterfall, iterative or agile) or processes related 
to privacy assurance (which are considered complementary to 
the engineering processes) can be found in the first full version 
of the methodology [9]. Section II below describes the relation 
between the two main existing analytical approaches to privacy 
requirements elicitation, namely goal-oriented and risk-based 
approaches, which are then independently discussed in sections 
III and IV. Moving into design, section V introduces three 
different approaches to designing system architectures for 
privacy. Section VI describes the current landscape of 
standardization and what is still missing there, and defines 
PRIPARE’s position and where its contributions may fit. 
Finally, section VII concludes the paper. 
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 II. OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES TO PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
The goal of a system engineering process is to fulfil the 
expectations of its stakeholders, by firstly finding the right 
trade-offs in order to set the balance among sometimes 
contradictory expectations, then translating them into 
operational requirements, and finally designing and 
implementing technical and organizational controls or 
measures that meet these requirements, in the systems being 
built.  
There are many potential sources for privacy and security 
requirements: end-users’ concerns, self-imposed policies, 
regulatory framework, prioritized risk scenarios and best 
practices and standards. However, it is not an easy task to elicit 
these multi-sourced privacy requirements as “there is still not a 
unified view on privacy requirements engineering” [10]. 
As a socio-technical issue, engineering privacy-friendly 
systems requires consideration of complex regulatory goals and 
user concerns, as well as stakeholders’ expectations. Privacy is 
usually described as a set of high level principles, gathered in a 
number of sector-specific and generic guidelines and 
regulations such as the US Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 
Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) [11], the EU Data 
Protection Directive (DPD) [12] and the forthcoming General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1], or the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
guidelines [13]. In this context, eliciting privacy requirements 
implies translating these high-level, abstract principles into 
operational requirements, joining them with requirements 
derived from end-user concerns and other stakeholders’ 
expectations, and solving the potential conflicts that may arise. 
These requirements can then lead to the design of technical and 
organizational measures (privacy controls), which are also 
suitable for the specific contexts where the system is intended 
to work. However, privacy principles are abstract concepts 
expressed in terms often far away from the domain of technical 
design, and thus they are often difficult to understand by 
engineers, who require a well-defined systematic methodology 
to define the appropriate privacy requirements in each case. 
Currently, two major approaches coexist to discover and 
identify operational privacy requirements during a software 
development process, namely: 1) risk-based and 2) goal-
oriented. Both approaches depart from a set of privacy 
principles, usually established by the pertinent legal 
framework, with the support of corporate policies. Each 
approach then develops along different paths (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. Goal-oriented vs risk-based privacy requirements elicitation 
Risk-based approaches start by identifying the assets to 
protect in the system under development and the threats that 
might compromise the accomplishment of the privacy 
principles on these assets. For instance, given the principle of 
ensuring the safety of personal data referenced in the EU DPD, 
a threat might involve an unauthorized party gaining access to 
some personal data. The threats are analyzed and the relevance 
of the subsequent risk is assessed, i.e., the combination of their 
probability and their impact. Then a treatment is proposed to 
address the risk associated with the threat. This treatment may 
range from doing nothing (accept the risk) to including 
requirements that may avoid or reduce the risk, modifying by 
its impact or its probability. During the design phase, the 
design team will identify and instantiate countermeasures 
(privacy controls) within the design to cover these 
requirements.  
In a goal-oriented approach, each principle can be 
described as a goal that the system must fulfil. For example, 
data protection authorities’ goals in Europe are related to the 
data protection principles stated in the EU GDPR, such as that 
of ‘accountability’ (i.e., ensuring and demonstrating 
compliance with data protection principles in practice). In turn, 
a user goal might consist in remaining anonymous while using 
the system. Each high-level goal (principle) can be 
deconstructed into a set of lower-level guidelines required to 
meet the goal, and each guideline can be in turn described as a 
set of operational requirements. Different requirements may 
turn out to be more or less critical to meet the privacy goals, 
which may be reflected by different priority levels attached to 
each requirement. Consequently, systems may protect privacy 
at different degrees by showing one of several levels of 
conformance with privacy goals, depending on the priority of 
the requirements they implement. 
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 Risk-based and goal-oriented processes are complementary, 
as both aim to provide an understanding of what the system has 
to do in order to comply with the privacy principles by means 
of a set of privacy requirements. However, they differ in the 
way they tackle this endeavor, as the former focuses on 
identifying a set of problems that must be fixed, while the latter 
focuses on identifying a set of features to be built. From 
another point of view, the two approaches complement each 
other as the goal-oriented one focuses on preventing privacy 
risks while the risk-based one considers controls for those risks 
that could not be prevented. 
Both approaches also show some contrasting features. On 
the one hand, a goal-oriented approach may be easier to follow 
by practitioners who are educated in systems engineering but 
have less expertise in privacy engineering. Guidelines detail 
how to concretize principles based on reusing previous, 
successful experience and knowledge. Notwithstanding that, 
these guidelines are not able to grasp a common privacy policy 
for the diverse systems to which they can be applied, as they do 
not deal directly enough with the specifics of each of them. In 
any case, they remove uncertainty by providing a minimum 
level of privacy at an early stage of the development process, 
thereby truly following the PbD paradigm. In addition, 
privacy-protecting decisions do not depend so much on the 
judgment of the system analyst as on the guidelines used, 
which are based on community-agreed practices. The decision 
to apply a specific privacy control (e.g., encrypt all traffic) will 
ultimately depend on the system developer, but it may rely on 
informed guidance rather than on their arbitrary judgment. 
Finally, success criteria provide a very basic but objective 
privacy metric as a result of the level of conformance selected.  
On the other hand, a risk-based approach focuses on the 
specificities of the system being developed, which allows for a 
deeper understanding and covers the uncertainties derived from 
potential privacy threats. This aspect is interesting as there are 
currently several sources where privacy risks are described, for 
example [14].  
Some frameworks for privacy analysis [15], whilst not 
explicitly, acknowledge the need to combine a goal-oriented 
with a risk-based approach in order to develop privacy-friendly 
systems. These frameworks claim to be risk-based; however, 
their major activities rather focus on barriers that prevent the 
achievement of privacy targets, instead of threats to privacy. 
These targets usually are derived from the corresponding legal 
framework (e.g., the EU DPD) of high-level privacy principles, 
which could be extended or adapted according to self-imposed 
policies or specific user concerns. 
In fact, the line that differentiates threats from goals is blurry. 
While sometimes it can be considered to be just a matter of 
positive or negative wording of a specific statement, in other 
cases, each of the approaches are suited for identifying 
different types of requirements (e.g., when eliciting 
requirements related to the data subject’s rights, it makes more 
sense to talk of goals than of risks). 
The reasons why we consider frameworks such as [15] 
goal-oriented (instead of purely risk-based) are: 
 they follow a systematic approach using catalogues as 
means to translate the high-level privacy principles 
into operational privacy requirements; 
 they define threats in terms of facts that can be 
assessed without any intrinsic uncertainty, disregarding 
the probability of occurrence; and 
 the selection of requirements and their specification 
according to the degree of protection demanded 
support systems that offer low, medium or high 
protection of personal data. 
PRIPARE’s methodology explicitly combines both 
approaches, by recommending, first, a goal-oriented approach 
that reduces privacy uncertainty at an early stage of the 
development process by eliciting a set of detailed requirements 
by following well-known, community-agreed catalogues (still 
to be developed); and, second, a system analysis approach for 
the remaining, system-specific risks, identifying adequate 
treatment according to several factors such as the risk level. In 
the end, some residual risks might remain, which must be 
identified and documented. These risk-based and goal-oriented 
approaches are respectively detailed in the next two sections.  
III.  RISK-BASED PRIVACY ANALYSIS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
While risk management methodologies have been used 
since World War II, in the field of security, they only date back 
to 1974 [16], and it is only in the last few years that they have 
been re-oriented to address privacy-specific issues by including 
privacy principles and concepts (identifiability and sensitivity 
of data, context and consent, impact on data subjects or 
privacy-specific safeguards). 
When an organization projects the development of a new 
system that deals with personal information, privacy risks may 
arise. A privacy impact assessment (PIA) is a systematic 
process conducted by the organization in consultation with 
stakeholders to identify privacy risks and minimize their 
impact [17]. The new EU GDPR already foresees mandatory 
Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) whenever 
systems are likely to present risks to the rights and freedoms of 
data subjects (e.g., monitoring publicly accessible areas or 
when processing sensitive information), which will mean a 
major push in the uptake of PIA practice.  
Prominent, current best practices on PIA [18], standards 
[20][21] guidelines [15], frameworks [22] and methodologies 
[23], all agree that a risk assessment process is key in order to 
conduct a PIA. Although some of these approaches may be 
very specific [15] in terms of how to conduct an assessment, 
others rely on the practitioners’ own insight [21]. PRIPARE 
has analyzed these and other documents in search of 
differences and common points that may be leveraged during 
the merger of all those, in particular, to understand how they 
handle legal compliance, the way they measure risks and their 
impact, and how they address the privacy issues detected. 
Following we provide an overview of the key findings, and 
what elements have been introduced in PRIPARE’s 
methodology. 
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 A. Complying with the Legal Framework 
While the whole PIA process can be considered as a means 
to ensure legal compliance, all of the PIA frameworks analyzed 
include a point or section that explicitly deals with the legal 
aspects of the project. Although law compliance could in 
principle be handled as just another risk category (‘legal’ or 
‘compliance risks’ [23]), it is more practical that PIA 
frameworks devote a separate activity for this, whose aim is to 
identify the relevant legal framework(s) and to ensure that the 
key defining elements of the project (e.g., business objectives, 
features or specific implementations) abide by the law. In order 
to facilitate this, most impact assessment frameworks provide a 
questionnaire, which attempts to make the practitioners ensure 
that the project is legally compliant. 
We regard these questionnaires, which can be described in 
layman’s terms, as particularly useful for new, inexperienced 
practitioners as they reflect, in a practical way, specific laws or 
groups of laws applicable to systems in general or to specific 
domains. This checklist approach in no way diminishes the 
need to assess the privacy risks of any system. 
B. Measuring Impact 
In risk management, the impact of a specific risk is 
traditionally measured in terms of economic losses. However, 
in the privacy domain, the impact is split and not only does it 
affect the organization, which may have financial losses 
(business impact), but also – and more importantly, in the light 
of fundamental rights – it falls on the shoulders of the data 
subject, who may be exposed to impacts in terms of their social 
standing and reputation, their financial well-being, their 
personal identity and their personal freedom. A contrasting 
approach is currently followed by some methodologies [23] 
that mainly focus on the data subject by measuring features 
such as the identifiability and sensitivity of all personal data 
collected, stored or processed. 
PRIPARE’s methodology recommends following a dual 
perspective (already present in [15]) considering the impact for 
both the organization and the data subjects. 
C. Measuring Risk 
There are several formulae used to calculate the risk index 
(or relevance) of feared events or threats, which can usually be 
reduced to a combination of the potential impact and the 
probability of occurrence. The scales employed to measure 
these individual factors, and how to react to a given risk index, 
vary from one framework to another. In [23], for example, a 1 
– 4 scale is employed to measure both probability and impact, 
and it maps the risk index to 4 levels (from negligible to 
maximum). On the other hand, in [15] a three-level scale (low, 
medium and high) is associated with privacy targets, and 
ignores the probability of occurrence of events, which can 
make the framework considered more similar to a goal-
oriented approach than to a risk-based one. 
In our opinion, there are no specific inherent benefits in 
choosing one type of scale over another. Different scales will 
adjust better to some domains and some regulations may 
impose some specific granularity of levels. Practitioners will 
have to decide on their approach according to the system 
specificities and their internal and external requirements.  
D. Addressing Privacy Issues 
Privacy controls are technical and organizational measures 
that are incorporated into systems and organizations, 
responsible for, or interacting with, those systems in order to 
address privacy issues (i.e., threats). After identifying the 
privacy issues that threaten the system, the risk management 
process must identify those requirements that may help to treat 
these risks subject to three different strategic risk management 
decisions: avoidance, modification/reduction, sharing/transfer. 
In some cases, mitigation will not be possible and the risks will 
have to be retained; these remaining risks should be clearly 
communicated to all the stakeholders involved. Each identified 
requirement brings with it constraints, costs, limitations and 
implications that must be correctly balanced to achieve the 
business objectives in a privacy-friendly way, without 
compromising other aspects such as performance or usability. 
Relating privacy requirements to specific threats and/or high 
level principles guarantees the traceability and accountability 
of the whole analysis and design process. 
The goal-oriented approach, complementary to the risk-
based approach, is described in the following section. 
IV. GOAL-ORIENTED PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
PbD is a process that involves technical and organizational 
means that embed and implement privacy and data protection 
principles in systems with distinct functionalities. As these 
principles are often derived from law, and as they are too often 
disconnected from engineering practices, it is important to 
provide a systematic method to make these high-level 
principles operational. The method described in the 
operationalization process must be supported with 
requirements catalogues or guidelines (which may be domain-
dependent) that will aid engineers in such a critical task. 
A. Requirements Sources 
Stakeholder needs and requirements represent the views of 
those at the business or enterprise operations level—that is, of 
users, acquirers, customers, and other stakeholders as they 
relate to the problem (or opportunity), as a set of requirements 
for a solution that can provide the services needed by the 
stakeholders in a defined environment [24]. Although users, 
acquirers, or customers may be familiar with the business 
domain to which the system belongs, very often the same 
stakeholders are not aware of or do not have the knowledge 
required to define the privacy goals of a system. Hence, the 
need to have a complementary approach for transforming high-
level principles—which may stem from regulations, internal 
policies or a body of knowledge shared by a community of 
practice—into requirements, minimizing the need to involve 
the privacy-unaware stakeholders, thus providing a system 
with a baseline that includes a basic level of privacy. 
PRIPARE’s goal-oriented approach to privacy analysis is 
accompanied by a proposed catalogue of requirements [25], 
which still has to be evolved and harmonized with the privacy 
practitioners’ community. The approach to goal-oriented 
154
 requirements provided within PRIPARE will make a set of 
requirements that are: 
1. heuristic, as they are compiled and mapped from the 
experience reflected in available best practices and 
domain-specific guidelines  [15][26]; 
2. stakeholder-neutral, as they reflect the variety of 
perspectives of privacy requirements expressed by the 
different agents involved; 
3. structured and hierarchized, as they are organized into 
a five-layer, successively refined model, from abstract 
principles and guidelines, to objective and operable 
definitions for privacy requirements that can be used to 
design and embed controls or measures and design test 
procedures; 
4. prioritized, according to the level of protection they 
provide; 
5. and predefined, usable as inputs by system developers, 
who can apply them straightforwardly to their systems.  
This catalogue draws its inspiration from a similar one that 
was standardized and developed for achieving accessibility 
within the World Wide Web Consortium’s Web Accessibility 
Initiative (W3C WAI): the Web Content Accessibility 
Guidelines (WCAG) [27]. A further discussion of the 
translation of the accessibility requirement concepts into the 
privacy realm can be found in [28]. 
B. Operationalization Process 
The process that enables the transformation of high-level 
privacy principles into operational requirements must be 
systematic, repeatable and easy to follow by engineers who are 
less privacy-savvy. The process is divided into two main 
phases: analysis and design. 
The analysis phase starts from the set of abstract privacy 
principles to be applied, and successively refines them to select 
from the whole set of privacy requirements available in the 
catalogue to those that are deemed to be implemented as 
technical or organizational measures. They deal with not only 
privacy protection ex post facto, but also design strategies that 
foster users’ privacy ex ante. The selection process considers 
the functional description of the system (dealing with its 
boundaries, data flows and privacy roles), and the desired level 
of conformance, in addition to organizational restrictions (e.g., 
in terms of performance, reliability, and budget). More 
specifically, it involves three steps: 
1. Identify the privacy principles that will guide the 
selection of a set of privacy-related requirements 
defined internally or externally, according to the 
overall definition of the privacy goal assumed by the 
organization, or established by the regulatory 
framework. 
2. Determine the required level of conformance for the 
system. It may be self-imposed following internal 
policies, or imposed by regulations or other 
stakeholders. 
3. Determine the applicability of each privacy 
requirement, depending on the system specification, 
the level of conformance desired and/or needed, and 
other organizational constraints. 
A detailed design phase complements the analysis later in 
the life cycle process, to translate the applicable privacy 
requirements into technical and organizational measures. This 
detailed design must match as well the decisions taken at the 
architectural level, resulting from the processes that will be 
presented in the next section. The framework also outlines a 
test suite, which assesses the adherence of a system to the 
guidelines for a specific conformance level, by stipulating that 
specific test cases are created to validate conformance with the 
specified requirements. These processes remain out of the 
scope of this paper; for details, refer to [25]. 
V. DESIGNING PRIVACY-COMPLIANT ARCHITECTURES  
The result of the requirements analysis phase (whether 
goal-oriented or risk-based) is a set of requirements for the 
system. The next phase is the design of the system based on 
these requirements. PRIPARE follows the approach that PbD 
should primarily materialize at the architectural level and be 
associated with suitable methodologies [29]. Many definitions 
of ‘architecture’ have been proposed in the literature. In this 
paper, we will adopt a definition inspired by [30]: The 
architecture of a system is the set of structures needed to reason 
about the system, which comprise software and hardware 
elements, relations among them (including data flows) and 
properties of both. In practice, it is increasingly necessary to 
address complex architectures, for example, distributed 
architectures connecting systems and large system 
architectures (systems of systems). 
Among other benefits, architectural descriptions enable a 
more systematic exploration of the design space. Architectures 
are often described in a pictorial way, using different kinds of 
graphs or semi-formal representations such as Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) diagrams (class diagrams, use 
case diagrams, sequence diagrams, communication diagrams, 
etc.). Even though such pictorial representations can be very 
useful, thinking about privacy requirements is such a subtle 
and complex issue that the architecture language used for this 
purpose must be defined in a formal way. By formal, we mean 
that some of the properties of the architectures can be defined 
in a mathematical logic, and reasoning about these properties 
must be supported by a formal proof or verification system. A 
source of complexity in the context of privacy is the fact that it 
often seems to conflict with other requirements, such as 
functional requirements, integrity requirements, performance, 
usability, etc. Formal methods make it possible to materialize 
precisely the concepts at hand (requirements, assumptions, 
guarantees, etc.) and to help designers explore the design space 
and reasons about possible choices. These kinds of formal 
methods have already been applied in order to verify 
cryptographic protocols [49] and to identify privacy 
weaknesses in electric vehicle charging protocols [31].  
The atomic architecture components are coarse-grained 
entities, such as modules, components or connectors. In the 
context of privacy, the components are typically privacy 
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 enhancing technologies (PETs), and the purpose of the 
architecture is their combination to satisfy simultaneously the 
functional and the privacy requirements of the system. 
Depending on the initial situation and availability of privacy 
requirements, code and/or architecture (e.g., initially being or 
not being privacy-compliant and demonstrating or not such 
compliance), different strategies can be applied to build a 
privacy-compliant architecture. In the following, we present 
three approaches, namely: top-down, bottom-up, and 
horizontal. Levels in this context refer to degrees of 
abstraction, with the top level corresponding to requirements 
(properties) and the low level to code or architecture. In 
addition, each approach can involve iterative steps. 
A. Top-down Approach 
The top-down approach is illustrated by the Computer-
Assisted Privacy Engineering framework (CAPRIV)[32]. It 
consists of deriving compliant architectures, starting from the 
set of requirements (privacy, functional, technical, etc.) 
resulting from the requirement analysis described in the 
previous sections. The process can be carried out in either a 
semi-formal framework or a formal framework (based on 
specifications of the individual components used in the 
architecture). 
In the top-down approach, the requirements can be 
expressed in a formal language (for example, a variant of 
epistemic logic as in [33]), and different choices of 
architectures can be proposed to the designer based on the trust 
assumptions between the stakeholders. Different types of trust 
can be distinguished [32], such as blind trust (assumption that 
an agent always behaves as expected), verifiable trust (a 
posteriori verification), or verified trust (a priori verification).  
B. Bottom-up Approach 
The bottom-up approach is applicable when a first version 
of the code (or a model of this code) is available. The goal is 
then to extract properties from this code showing that the 
desired privacy requirements are satisfied. This approach has 
been applied in PRIPARE to an electric vehicle charging 
scenario [34]. A major challenge of these vehicles is their 
somewhat limited range, requiring the deployment of many 
charging stations. To effectively deliver electricity to vehicles 
and guarantee payment, a protocol exists as part of the ISO 
15118 [35] standardization effort. A privacy-preserving variant 
of this protocol, POPCORN [31], has been proposed in recent 
work, claiming to provide significant privacy for the user, 
whilst maintaining functionality. We have defined a formal 
model of the protocol and its expected privacy properties in the 
applied Pi-Calculus [36] and used ProVerif [49] to check them. 
This approach has made it possible to identify weaknesses in 
the protocol and to suggest improvements to address them. 
C. Horizontal Approach 
The horizontal approach is illustrated by methodologies 
focusing on privacy-enhancing architectures (PEARs), a term 
coined by [37]. An example of such methodology could be 
based on architecture analysis and evaluation methods such as 
the “Cost–Benefit Analysis Method” [47] (CBAM) and 
“Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method” (ATAM) [48], 
developed in the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering 
Institute. The main objective of this process is to start with an 
initial architecture and to enhance it in order to achieve the 
desired business objectives, whilst achieving privacy goals and 
avoiding privacy risks as well as ensuring security. Changes in 
the architecture are measured under different scenarios in order 
to determine if the change provides a positive or negative 
impact on the overall system. 
The resulting PEAR process is based mostly on the use of 
scenarios, which are “structured means to state attribute 
requirements”. There are six elements to a scenario: the source 
of a stimulus, the stimulus, the environment of the artifact 
being stimulated, the artifact itself, the response of the artifact 
and the measure of such response (Fig. 2). 
Environment
Stimulus 
Source Artifact
Response 
measureStimulus Response
 
Fig. 2. PEAR scenario elements 
PEAR is an iterative process involving the following steps: 
1. Present an initial architecture. 
2. Identify and prioritize scenarios and quality attributes. 
3. Identify potential architectural security and privacy 
enhancements. 
4. Select and apply privacy and security architectural 
approaches to the scenario. 
The PEAR process relies on the selection and application, 
at an architectural level, of privacy strategies, patterns and 
technologies, to address the challenge of resolving conflicts 
between privacy objectives and other requirements of the 
system. The process has been endorsed by the European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) [6]. 
VI. TOWARDS COMMON PRIVACY-BY-DESIGN PRACTICES 
The advent of PbD will depend on the availability of an 
ecosystem through which consensus-based practices and 
solutions can emerge. In recent years, initiatives have been 
taken up to promote guidelines or codes of practice, with some 
of them leading to standard proposals. PIAs are one such 
example: guidelines are available today, such as in the UK 
[38], while work on standardization is ongoing (ISO 29134 
[20]).  
Currently, two major organizations contribute to the 
standardization work on privacy and privacy by design. The 
International Organization for Standardisation (ISO), in 
particular through WG 5 of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, has focused 
on standards related to frameworks (e.g., ISO 29100[39] – 
privacy framework; ISO 29101[40] – privacy architecture 
framework), and management (e.g., ISO 29134[20] – Privacy 
impact assessments, ISO 29151[41] – Code of practice for PII 
protection). OASIS has focused on standards related to the 
PbD process: OASIS PMRM TC specifies a process to convert 
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 privacy requirements into operational requirements [21], while 
OASIS PbD-SE TC focuses on software engineering 
documentation [42]. PRIPARE contributes, firstly, to the 
provision of a dual viewpoint, by integrating both risk-based 
and goal-oriented approaches; and secondly, it integrates 
privacy as an attribute in architectural analysis. Finally, the 
European Commission has recently issued a mandate for the 
establishment of European standards on PbD [43]. It is 
important that such work remains complementary to the 
aforementioned standards, in order not to create fragmentation. 
PRIPARE is currently an organization member of OASIS 
and actively participates in the PMRM and PbD-SE technical 
committees. PRIPARE members have already contacted their 
national standardization bodies in order to participate in the 
development of the aforesaid EC-mandated PbD standard, and 
will present the PRIPARE project and methodology to the 
relevant working group of CEN/CENELEC (European 
Committee for Standardization and European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization). 
One critical phase in the PbD process is the selection of 
technology measures (for instance, a security protocol). This 
requires specialized expertise that is seldom available. Two 
approaches have been proposed. The first is to create a 
technology community that would publish and share common 
solutions, often called privacy patterns. PRIPARE is currently 
working on the creation of this type of repository [44]. The 
second is based on the organization of domain-specific 
consensus (e.g., smart grids, intelligent transport systems, 
smart cities) on the selection of appropriate technologies. They 
correspond to the concept of best available techniques (BAT) 
promoted by the European Data Protection Supervisor [45], 
also recommended in the case of smart grids [46]. We believe 
these approaches to be complementary. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
PRIPARE has opted for leveraging complementary existing 
best privacy practices, by integrating them in two dimensions: 
first, along the different activities of the SDLC; and second, 
offering alternatives within the same activity, and 
recommending the situations where each applies best. That 
way, their synergistic positive impact is maximized and their 
weak points are cancelled, thereby taking advantage of their 
touch points. 
Following on from the PIA and risk assessment study, 
PRIPARE has decided to follow a dual approach in its 
methodology, complementing a goal-oriented approach with a 
risk-based one, including the PIA approach to directly cover 
the legal compliance aspects; and end-user and business 
perspectives when measuring risks, also taking into account 
sensitivity and identifiability levels of personal data attributes. 
This combination provides an objective, systematic, goal-
oriented approach, complemented by a more subjective, risk-
based approach, which may capture some privacy issues that 
cannot be addressed by merely applying rigid guidelines. 
Including complementary approaches with the same goal in 
a unified methodology allows its practitioners to adopt the 
practices that provide the best fit to specific problems, 
situations or organizations. PRIPARE has established a 
unifying reference model that links the common points of each 
practice, key for the successful merger of these practices. For 
instance, both goal-oriented and risk-based approaches depart 
from high-level principles that must be closely matched by 
identified privacy targets – expressed as guidelines – that 
finally guide the elicitation of privacy requirements, which 
help to achieve the privacy targets, and avoid, mitigate or 
accept the feared events. 
The methodology has also identified specific processes to 
address the new accountability principle (appearing in the 
forthcoming EU GDPR [1]), and user-empowerment and 
usability, one of the major current challenges in PbD. This 
allows positioning PRIPARE’s methodology as a tool to 
achieve truly user-centric PbD systems, whilst demonstrating 
compliance with the selected privacy principles. In no case 
does PRIPARE propose what systems need to be built, but it 
helps to achieve privacy in those systems that are to be 
created—and it may impact their design decisions. 
PRIPARE is moving toward validating its methodology. 
For that, three research projects have been selected, funded by 
the European Commission’s Research and Technological 7th 
Framework Programme (FP7), to embed privacy and security, 
ensuring both that these projects correctly address privacy 
issues, and that the methodology is validated in practice, in 
terms of being efficient, practical and aligned with real-world 
system engineering practices. 
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